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This, however, has not prevented scholars from making great claims about the Statute's impact on West Germany's relationship with the Nazi past. Peter Reichel argues that the debates opened up a delayed inter-generational dialogue on this period, while Jeffrey Herf suggests the Statute constituted a wake-up call for the Federal Republic, bringing the 'crimes of the Nazi past, as well as the magnitude of judicial failure of the 1950s, to centre stage in West German politics'. 6 Peter Steinbach sees the eventual changes that were made to the laws governing murder as proof of the Republic's 'commitment to develop a moral-political consciousness of history, as well as a sense of ethical-political responsibility.' 7 Consequently, as Buscher points out, the Statute, and especially the round of debates heard in 1965, has been depicted as one of the Bundestag's 'finest hours', evidence of liberal democracy in action. 8 The reality, however, was rather more complicated and closer analysis of the Statute's resonance within wider society highlights the persistence of earlier post-war mythologies, evasions and distortions in respect of the recent past.
This article consequently examines the considerable public discussion generated by the Statute during the 1960s. Drawing upon a variety of sources including government memoranda, opinion poll data and media reports, it explores the arguments put for and against continued war crimes investigations, and asks just where the impetus for continued judicial action was coming from. Above all, this article demonstrates that this was an issue that resonated far beyond the Federal Republic of Germany. Responses in Britain offer a particularly striking case study in this regard. As one of the 'four Great Nations' that had sat in judgement at Nuremberg, and conducted additional war crimes trials within its own zone of occupied Germany, Britain had been at the heart of early policy initiatives against Nazi perpetrators. 9 As this article will show, there were numerous groups within Britain who deliberately looked to this legacy as proof of the nation's moral duty to pressure the West German government into abolishing the Statute and ensure that the Federal Republic remained on the 'right' path. Given an existing historiography that tends to be quite critical of Britain's record on Nazi war criminals, this episode offers an important reminder that war crimes trials remained a sensitive yet persistent talking point on both sides of the North Seaand debates over the Statute may be seen as a crucial step on the path towards the formation of a wider, western Holocaust consciousness. 10 A 'Guilty Few'
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Arguably, the sheer scale of the Nazi genocide, and the number of perpetrators required to orchestrate it, had been underestimated (or conveniently ignored) from the start. The
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg focussed on the most high-profile, surviving members of the Nazi leadership such as Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess and Julius Streicher, while Britain's prosecution of Bergen-Belsen personnel in the previous months saw the key defendants demonised in the popular press as 'beasts' and 'monsters'. 11 Together, these proceedings facilitated the popular belief that the blame for atrocities rested firmly on those at the top, or a sadistic few.
By March 1948, British military courts had tried 909 individuals, compared with the prosecution of 1,672 defendants in the US occupation zone, and 427 in the French zone. Of these, 214 people were sentenced to death, 258 were acquitted, and the remainder received various periods of imprisonment.
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The British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin noted optimistically, 'the whole process of trying war criminals is now nearly finished… [and] will be completed in a few months'. 13 The implication (and one that was shared by the West German population) was that all the 'really guilty' individuals had been dealt with; there was simply no need for further proceedings.
The western Allies' commitment to war crimes proceedings certainly transpired to be relatively short-lived, affected in part by the onset of the Cold War. There was no second, Four-Power tribunal and it is notable that many of cases heard in the British zone focussed on crimes perpetrated against Allied personnel, including the infamous murder of British POWs who escaped from Stalag Luft III. 14 These were war crimes that would have a particular resonance for British audiences back home, where public opinion was already struggling to understand why precious resources should be squandered on the former enemy. A lack of manpower and financial support also meant that British enthusiasm for trials soon waned. 15 Likewise, the number of war crimes cases being heard before reconstituted West German courts declined sharply during the 1950s, falling from 68 in 1950 to just 17 by 1957. 16 The vast majority of these trials also ended with the acquittal of all defendants. 17 The political climate increasingly favoured a reduction of existing sentences and a general amnesty for former Nazis rather than continued punitive action. Popular references to 'the warcondemned' or 'so-called war criminals' added to the sense that the number of genuine war criminals was very small, and precluded any wider soul-searching regarding the recent past. 18 4 Church gathered in Düsseldorf for two successive synods that included a discussion on the relevance of the Statute for Nazi atrocities. Despite expressing reservations over the courts' ability to uncover the facts so long after the events concerned, the Church took up the cry for continued investigations. A seven page document disseminated through the pulpit, as well as the religious and secular press, stressed how all Germans were implicated in Nazi crimes, rued the Church's failure to take concerted action at the time, and insisted that 'in any society, evil must be recognised as abominable and must be punished accordingly'. 28 The wider West German media was also generally supportive of further trials, regardless of their political leanings. Der Spiegel, for example, framed a fourteen page article on the Statute with an arresting front cover photograph depicting three elderly figures about to be shot by Nazi commandos, reminding people of the brutal nature of the crimes under discussion. 29 Members of the Bundestag were allowed a free vote on the Statute in the spring of 1965.
Opinion was split between and within political parties. Broadly speaking, though, the conservative CDU tended to argue that prosecutors had now had sufficient time to bring suspects to account and the Statute should therefore be allowed to come into effect. The FDP also wanted to uphold the Statute, maintaining that any other move would undermine public faith in the rule of law. The SPD, though, generally agreed with survivors' groups that the magnitude of Nazi crimes must override other concerns, that the original criminal code had been drawn up to deal with crimes committed in 'everyday' circumstances rather than a racial war of extermination, and that investigations into those responsible should thus continue. 30 Observers within the British Foreign Office summed up the prevailing mood:
The question has placed the Federal Government in a dilemma. On the one hand, they do not wish to be exposed to the charge that they are using the Statute of Limitations in order to cover up Nazi crimes... On the other hand, they do not want these trials, with all the received publicity about German wartime atrocities that accompanies them, to drag on indefinitely year after year and so to keep alive in the world the feeling that the Germans are a particularly cruel and evil race who should not be trusted. 31 Reporting for the Jewish Chronicle, Eleonore Sterling suggested that there was a 'striking discrepancy' between public and private opinion on the war crimes issue. 32 Buscher too has argued that 'the awareness shown by some politicians, journalists, legal experts and intellectuals failed to have a trickle-down effect' and that 'the average citizen refused to break with the Vergangenheitspolitik of the 1950s'. 33 Opinion polls seem to confirm that the effects of the Ulm and Eichmann trials quickly wore off to be replaced by a sense of 'trial fatigue'. In October 1963, the IfD found that just 34 per cent of people questioned approved of continued trials. 34 In May 1965, as parliamentary debates over the Statute reached fever pitch, pollsters again took to the streets to gauge public feeling on the matter. 344 people over the age of 21 were interviewed across the Federal Republic, with the results showing 32
per cent in favour of further trials, and 57 per cent preferring to draw a final line (Schluβstrich) under the whole Nazi era. 35 The sample for this survey was, admittedly, extremely small, yet the findings were borne out by other opinion researchers. The Wickert
Institute, for example, found 37 per cent of men and just 22 per cent of women supporting continued war crimes proceedings. 36 Significantly, there tended to be a rather different set of results if people were interviewed in relation to a specific case. During the Auschwitz trial, for example, DIVO found 53 per cent of respondents articulating the need for such proceedings to be continued -and staff noted that even this figure was in marked decline to the responses generated by the Eichmann trial three years earlier. 37 Arguably, it was easier for people to agree with the punishment of a particularly notorious individual or set of crimes, cases that were already attracting considerable media attention, than the somewhat abstract principle of continued war crimes investigations. Again, there was perhaps a sense that these were isolated affairs, with the defendants continuing to fit the mould of a radical 'few'. By contrast, altering the Statute would imply that there was a wider set of responsibilities to contend with, and this was a far more unsettling prospect.
The apparent reluctance to challenge the Statute of Limitations stemmed from a variety of concerns. There were legitimate questions over the reliability of witness and defendant memories so long after the commission of the crimes and the likelihood of securing a successful prosecution. 38 It could also be argued that continued trials served no social purpose; the perpetrators of Nazi crimes had (as illustrated so keenly with the Ulm case) long since been reintegrated into the fabric of West German society. 39 If it were really true that the majority of West Germans did not wish investigations of this nature to continue, there would, he [Schule] said, be no investigations because the popular will would be expressed in amnesty legislation... What he did often find when addressing public audiences was feelings of uneasiness and shame which translated themselves into the suggestion that such proceedings should be hushed up so as not to drag the name of Germany in the mud. Commons into action after Kristallnacht in 1938. 44 The same month saw Robert Kempner, former Assistant Chief Counsel for the US Prosecution at Nuremberg, taking to North German radio, addressing his concerns about the Statute direct to the West German people. 45 Elsewhere, the renowned Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal orchestrated a letter-writing campaign, sending over three hundred missives to 'influential' people around the globe and urging them, in turn, to lobby the Federal German government. 46 As the involvement of Kempner, Wiesenthal and Noel Baker illustrates, many of the voices heard during this affair came from individuals with a prior history of trying to draw attention to Nazi crimes. Survivors' groups, Jewish organisations and trade unions were particularly vocal, understandably wanting to see justice delivered on behalf of their murdered brethren and political comrades. There was also an immense amount of pressure from the Soviet Union and its satellite states, although this was unsurprising given the existing ideological tensions and a history of East German critiques on its western counterpart's handling of the past. 47 The USSR heard public speeches from its own Nuremberg prosecutors, alongside statements from former soldiers and concentration camp survivors and the screening of a documentary film on Auschwitz. 48 China, meanwhile, attacked the Statute as 'monstrous', a 'brazen defiance of international law' and 'sacrilege to millions upon millions of innocent victims'. 49 Most of these actions were condemned by western observers as Communist 'propaganda', but the potential ramifications of the Statute could not be so easily dismissed.
Advocates of continued war crimes investigations stressed a sense of duty towards the victims of the Third Reich, and the distinctiveness of Nazi atrocities. the domestic press suggesting that the current fiasco was a direct result of the Allies' own failings in the immediate aftermath of the war. The Guardian commented:
The Western Powers should not forget that in their day, they were none too quick off the mark in the same field. Undoubtedly, they allowed far too many former Nazis to creep back into positions of influence... The sovereign West German government could hardly be expected to weed out men whom the Allies had permitted to survive. 'Either we must tell the Germans that we still have a number of documents which it would take two or three months to go through... or we must omit all reference to the existence of these documents and give a more general reply on the lines that we have been unable so far to find anything which would be of interest to the Germans', noted officials. 65 The time required to peruse the material was only part of the issue; there were also concerns about political security. The Ministry of Defence declared that German experts 'certainly cannot' be granted access to the material themselves, while, for the Foreign Office, W.B.J Ledwidge appealed for more leeway, pointing out, 'the United States Government have already done this [opened their archives] and we should not seem to be less forthcoming or there may be press and parliamentary concern.' 66 This comment again sums up much of the political response to the Statute both in Britain and in West Germany: public relations assumed a greater importance than any moral obligation to ensure Nazi perpetrators could not evade justice.
While Britain dragged its heels, suggesting that material may already be in Bonn or with the UNWCC, or offering to consult its records in respect of any 'specific case which the Federal Government is able to name', the USSR launched a scathing attack on the whole documents issue. For the Soviets, the West German request for assistance was a ploy, 'an improper attempt to disguise the actual amnesty of the fascist murderers and to whitewash its unlawful actions in the eyes of world public opinion'. 67 In reality, the information request constituted a crucial effort to 'stop the clock' running down on Nazi perpetrators as, under West German law, the Statute of Limitations would be interrupted at the beginning of a criminal investigation. In theory, the move could have enabled West Germany to enjoy the best of both worlds, using the existing system to prosecute more war criminals while sparing the nation any challenge to its legal framework. The information request also underscores the constraints that West German prosecutors were working under at the time. The realities of division, not to mention the chaos at the end of the war, meant evidence was not in any single, easy to access archive.
When analysing the various petitions against the Statute during this period, it is important to recognise that there was no simple dichotomy between governments and various pressure groups. Even among those lobbying for continued trials, there was indecision as to the best means of achieving this. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, for example, saw debate between a leadership that preferred to adopt a resolution and make gentle overtures to the West German Ambassador, and a membership keen to generate greater publicity for the campaign through public meetings, vigils and a march on the West German embassy. In January 1965, the Workers' Circle Friendly Society opined that the issue 'merits much more action and publicity', while the Leeds Jewish Representative Council questioned whether local action could advance the campaign. 68 The Deputy for Hightown Central Synagogue in
Manchester ultimately decided to organise his own silent march of protest. 69 In trying to quell some of these elements, the Board was anxious to avoid any possible disruption to the diplomatic process, or doing anything that might create the impression that they themselves 'had not been active in the matter'. Solution' continued to be obscured. 73 The distinction between callous killers acting out of 'blood lust' and those merely doing their 'duty', had already become a marked feature of war crimes proceedings. During the 1963-5
Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, for example, the emphasis in both the press and the courtroom was Defendants who showed a rare moment of mercy towards their victims received favourable treatment before the courts compared with colleagues who had seemingly taken great pleasure in devising their own unique brand of torture. 74 Likewise, numerous trials still saw defendants depicted as 'devils' within media reports -a dehumanising rhetoric that enabled the 'ordinary' population to distance themselves from these characters and avoid any deeper, critical reflection on how the Holocaust had been made possible.
On 26 June 1969, the Bundestag again voted to extend the Statute, this time for an additional ten years. 279 members supported the bill, 126 opposed it and there were 4 abstentions. A decade later, the vote was much closer, yet finally, on 3 July 1979, the application to remove the Statute for all cases of murder was passed after a ten hour parliamentary debate, 255 votes to 222. 75 The path was now free for West German prosecutors to continue their work in relation to the crimes of National Socialism. Why the change of heart? Clearly, the increased opposition vote between 1969 and 1979 demonstrates that the problem of Nazi war criminals remained highly contentious; public opinion too was shown as increasingly opposed to further legal proceedings. 76 To some extent, the answer may rest with broader cultural developments taking place at this time, particularly the screening of the American television miniseries, Holocaust in the spring of 1979 which is frequently credited with effecting a shift in popular attitudes to the Nazi past. 77 Certainly, correspondence generated Owen, to justify advances to the West German Ambassador. 83 Wiesenthal, meanwhile, organised a visit of US politicians, civil rights leaders and Jewish representatives to Bonn to press the government on the Statute, and the Auswärtiges Amt received further petitions from the US House of Representatives, the Polish, Israeli and Luxembourg governments and 'tens of thousands of privately written protests'. 84 Observers within the British embassy in Bonn concluded, 'there can be no doubt that the government are very conscious of these external aspects and are taking them fully into account', and Schmidt did reference the 'enormous number of petitions' received from within and outside West Germany during a speech to the Bundestag in March 1979.
Against this background, the British government adopted a slight change in its own tactics.
Alongside the standard response that it would be inappropriate for Britain to involve itself in an internal, German matter, petitioners were now invited to direct their concerns straight to the Federal German government. In February 1979, for example, Lord Goronwy-Roberts wrote that 'there has been some recent well published evidence of the degree of concern which continues to be felt among people of all ages in the Federal Republic about this kind of issue'; sensing that the time was ripe for change, Foreign Office staff began to encourage, rather than shut down, protests by academics, MPs, synagogues and the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen. Convention on the same issue was opened for signatures in 1974. 87 More recently, the notion that acts of genocide should be exempt from any legal prescription was further cemented with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 88 None of these measures has the full backing of the international community, and there remains significant debate over the necessity of such measures. War crimes investigations and prosecutions too, remain imperfect affairs. Nonetheless, the very existence of these conventions has symbolic value, designed to show would-be transgressors that human rights violations will not go unpunished and act as some form of deterrent. All of this can be traced directly to the legacy of the 
